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Abstract
There are two main ways of deﬁning secrecy of cryptographic protocols. The ﬁrst version checks if the
adversary can learn the value of a secret parameter. In the second version, one checks if the adversary can
notice any diﬀerence between protocol runs with diﬀerent values of the secret parameter.
We give a new proof that when considering more complex equational theories than partially invertible
functions, these two kinds of secrecy are not equally diﬃcult to verify. More precisely, we identify a message
language equipped with a convergent rewrite system such that after a completed protocol run, the ﬁrst
problem mentioned above (adversary knowledge) is decidable but the second problem (static equivalence)
is not. The proof is by reduction of the ambiguity problem for context-free grammars.
Keywords: Security protocol analysis, Term rewriting, Decidability.
1 Introduction
There are two main ways of specifying secrecy for a cryptographic protocol.
(1) One common approach is to see if the attacker can deduce the value of a secret
parameter of the protocol, after some interaction with the protocol participants.
This disclosure-based approach is taken in, e.g., [15,17,13].
(2) The other approach is to check whether the attacker can notice any diﬀerence
between protocol runs with diﬀerent values of the secret parameter. This indis-
tinguishability-based approach ﬁts naturally into the process calculus frame-
work [5,8], is a standard notion of secrecy of cryptographic primitives [12],
and is thus often used for protocol analysis in the probabilistic polynomial-
time tradition [16]. This approach can also be used for other properties than
secrecy, by comparing an implementation of the protocol with an executable
speciﬁcation.
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Independently of the particular security properties to be veriﬁed, the formal
cryptography tradition [11] is moving towards a more complete treatment of al-
gebraic properties of cryptographic primitives [4] as well as a more ﬁne-grained
treatment of “compound primitives” such as block encryption algorithms used in
electronic code book or cipher block chaining mode, or message authentication
codes [14]. However, algorithms treating such more complex message algebras are
often deﬁned ad-hoc [9] and/or without termination guarantees (e.g., naive addi-
tions to ProVerif [6]). Recent work [1,3] aims at ﬁnding a suﬃciently large class of
message algebras, where the relevant properties still are decidable.
In this paper, we prove that there exist message algebras in which after a protocol
run, disclosure is decidable but indistinguishability is not. The proof is by reducing
the ambiguity problem for context-free grammars to an indistinguishability problem.
Previously, a proof sketch for this separation result, based on another undecidable
problem relating two pairs of Turing machines, appeared in [1,2]. The present paper
is, to the knowledge of the author, the ﬁrst published instance of a full proof.
2 Formal Cryptography
The basic idea behind formal cryptography is to abstract from the actual encryption
algorithms used, and instead work with some suitable message algebra. The reason
for this is that cryptographic primitives are often in themselves fairly complex al-
gorithms, and the guarantees that they provide are usually based on probabilities
and computation time. Taken together, this makes for a complicated model for the
veriﬁcation.
Formal cryptography, on the other hand, works with algebraic relationships be-
tween cryptographic primitives. Implicit in this approach is that the only possible
operations on messages are the ones deﬁned by the algebra. Thus, formal cryptog-
raphy is the study of protocols under assumptions of perfect cryptography.
2.1 Message Algebras
Deﬁnition 2.1 We assume countably inﬁnite sets of names n ∈ N , variables x ∈ V
and function symbols f ∈ F , and a ﬁnite signature Σ : F ⇀ N taking function
symbols to their arity (which may be 0). The set of terms TΣ is then deﬁned by
t, u ::= n | x | f(t1, . . . , tn) where Σ(f) = n. Let |t|u be the number of occurrences
of u in t. We let n(t) be the names and v(t) be the variables of a term t. The
concrete terms T cΣ are those that do not contain any variables.
In algebras for cryptography, message equality is typically induced by some rewrite
system. In the case of symmetric cryptography, this may be as simple as the single
rule dec(enc(x, k), k) → x, stating that a message x encrypted (enc) under the key
k can be decrypted (dec) using the same key.
In order to more accurately model the behavior of particular implementations of
cryptographic primitives, one can add to and modify this rule [10]. One drawback
with such reﬁnements is that the rewrite system might no longer be convergent,
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so the decidability of equality must be proven for each variation. Since names are
often used to model many diﬀerent types of cryptographic data, such as public and
private keys, nonces, and primitive messages, we also permit rewrite rules that apply
only to names of a certain type. This gives the adversary increased distinguishing
power.
Deﬁnition 2.2 A rewrite rule is of the form “t1 → t2 if φ“, where t1, t2 ∈ TΣ and
φ is a conjunction of membership predicates xi ∈ Si for certain Si ⊆ N . We require
v(t2) ∪ v(φ) ⊆ v(t1). An equational theory E is deﬁned by a ﬁnite set of rewrite
rules. A term t matches a rewrite rule of the form above if there is a substitution
σ : v(t1) → TΣ such that t = t1σ and φσ is true. If E is an equational theory
deﬁned by a set containing this rewrite rule, t can be head rewritten to t2σ, which
we write t →hE t2σ. We let →E be the closure of →
h
E under contexts, and ≡E be
the transitive, reﬂexive and symmetric closure of →E. When E is clear from the
context, we often omit it.
As an example, if we assume a set of DES keys KDES ⊂ N , the rewrite rule
“IsDESKey(x)→ true if x ∈ KDES” permits checking if a message x is a name that
can be used as key for the symmetric encryption algorithm DES.
Note that since theories are deﬁned by a ﬁnite set of rewrite rules, the set of
names has a ﬁnite partitioning into equivalence classes with respect to these rules,
so exhaustive enumerations can work modulo this equivalence without any impact
on decidability properties.
In what follows, we will assume that ≡E is decidable; this is notably the case if
the rewrite system →E is conﬂuent and terminating. For these (convergent) rewrite
systems, we write t↓ for the unique term such that t →∗E t↓ 	→E.
2.2 Frames and Operations
The most important dynamic characteristic of a Dolev-Yao adversary is the set of
messages that it has learned by communicating with the legitimate participants
of the protocol. This message set is the only information needed to verify if the
adversary knows a particular (conﬁdential) datum. For the indistinguishability-
based approach we want to compare results of corresponding operations on the
knowledge of two adversaries, so we need some way of relating the corresponding
messages. One way of doing this, used in [8] for the spi calculus, is to represent
the attacker knowledge as a substitution. Here, messages known to two diﬀerent
adversaries (i.e., in the range of the corresponding substitutions) are related if they
have the same pre-image.
As usual, the adversary can apply any combination of cryptographic functions
to the messages he possesses. He can also freshly generate names (nonces, keys, ...),
that must be chosen diﬀerent from all other names in the system. In order to pre-
serve this distinction, we augment the substitution representing attacker knowledge
with a tuple of names that cannot be freshly generated. This augmented knowledge
is called a frame, following [1].
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Deﬁnition 2.3 A frame ϕ is a pair (νN)σ, where N ⊂ N is ﬁnite and
σ : V ⇀ T cΣ is partial with ﬁnite domain. We let bn((νN)σ) := N .
The disclosure-based deﬁnition of secrecy corresponds to asking whether, after a
completed run of the protocol, the frame representing the adversary knowledge can
generate the value of the secret parameter. For the indistinguishability-based deﬁ-
nition we ask whether one can notice any diﬀerence, using only ≡E, when studying
pairs of messages generated simultaneously.
Deﬁnition 2.4 The frame ϕ := (νN)σ can primitively generate the message (term)
t, written ϕ 
p t, if there is t′ such that n(t′) ∩N = ∅, v(t′) ⊆ dom(σ) and t′σ = t.
Given an equational theory E, ϕ generates t in E, written ϕ 
E t, if there is t
′ such
that ϕ 
p t′ and t′ ≡E t.
Two frames ϕ1 := (νN1)σ1 and ϕ2 := (νN2)σ2 where dom(σ1) = dom(σ2) are
indistinguishable under E, written ϕ1 ≈E ϕ2, if for all t, u such that (n(t)∪ n(u))∩
(N1 ∪N2) = ∅ and (v(t) ∪ v(u)) ⊆ dom(σ1), we have tσ1 ≡E uσ1 iﬀ tσ2 ≡E uσ2.
In regard to automated veriﬁcation, since TΣ is enumerable we immediately get
that the message construction problem is semidecidable and the indistinguishabil-
ity problem is co-semidecidable (assuming that ≡E is decidable). An important
question for automated veriﬁcation is for which message algebras these problems
are decidable. In [1], the authors proved that in message algebras with the encryp-
tion rule mentioned above, decidability of ≈E implies decidability of 
E. Moreover,
they gave an example of a convergent rewrite system E with 
E decidable but ≈E
undecidable. In this paper, we exhibit another rewrite system with the same prop-
erties but in a simpler setting (context-free grammars versus Turing machines), and
develop a full proof.
3 Reduction of Ambiguity to Static Equivalence
Our example message algebra, where deduction is decidable but static equivalence is
not, is based on leftmost derivations of context-free grammars in Chomsky normal
form. We ﬁrst recall some deﬁnitions for such grammars.
3.1 Context-free grammars
A context-free grammar G = (AG,XG, sG, TG∪NG) in Chomsky normal form (CNF)
consists of terminal symbols AG, non-terminal symbols XG
(with AG ∩XG = ∅), an initial symbol sG ∈ XG, and two kinds of derivation rules:
terminal and non-terminal rules. Terminal rules (n → t) ∈ TG take a non-terminal
symbol n to a terminal symbol t, whereas non-terminal rules (n → n1n2) ∈ NG take
a non-terminal symbol to two non-terminal symbols.
A leftmost derivation of w˜ ∈ A∗GX
∗
G is a word r1 · · · rk ∈ (TG∪NG)
∗ where there
exist words a˜0, a˜1, . . . , a˜k ∈ A∗G and x˜
0, x˜1, . . . , x˜k ∈ X∗G such that a˜
0x˜0 = sG, a˜
kx˜k =
w˜ and for all i = 1, . . . , k we have that either
ri = (n → t) ∈ TG, a˜
i = a˜i−1t and nx˜i = x˜i−1, or ri = (n → n1n2) ∈ NG,
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a˜i = a˜i−1 and x˜i = ny˜ and x˜i−1 = n1n2y˜ for some y˜. It is easy to show that k above
(the length of the derivation) is equal to |w˜|+ |a˜n| − 1. Such a derivation is called
partial if w˜ 	∈ A∗G. The language of a grammar L(G) is the set of words over AG
that have a leftmost derivation. Additionally, a grammar in CNF has no useless
non-terminals, in the following sense.
∀x ∈ XG ∃w˜1, w˜2, r˜ such that r˜ is a leftmost G-derivation of w˜1xw˜2
∧ L(AG,XG, x, TG ∪NG) 	= ∅
A grammar G is ambiguous if there exists a word w˜ ∈ L(G) that has two
diﬀerent leftmost derivations. A classical result in formal language theory is the
undecidability of whether a given context-free grammar (in CNF) is ambiguous. In
what follows, we deﬁne a rewrite system such that this problem is equivalent to the
indistinguishability problem for a particular frame pair.
3.2 Message algebra
We now introduce a message algebra intended to model leftmost derivation accord-
ing to the rules of a context-free grammar in Chomsky normal form. Let Σ be the
following signature.
Symbol Arity Intuitive meaning
Nil 0 Nil
id 1 Non-terminal identiﬁer
(· . ·) 2 Pair
OK 2 Name type check
T 2 Terminal grammar rule
N 3 Non-terminal grammar rule
dc 5 Derivation context
The ﬁve arguments of the derivation context (dc) have the following meanings:
1 The symbol with which a derivation started.
2 (Ensures that rewriting does not reduce the size of terms.)
3 A list of terminals forming a preﬁx of the word that is derived.
4 A list of the non-terminals that remain to be rewritten.
5 A list of the derivation rules that have not yet been applied.
Let E be the equational theory on Σ induced by the following rewrite rules:
dc(Nil, Nil, Nil, Nil, (T(y, t) . u)) →
dc(y, (OK(Nil, Nil) . Nil), (t . Nil), Nil, u) (1)
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dc(Nil, Nil, Nil, Nil, (N(y, t1, t2) . u)) →
dc(y, (OK(Nil, Nil) . Nil), Nil, (t1 . (t2 . Nil)), u) (2)
dc(v, w, x, (y . z), (T(y, t) . u)) → dc(v, (OK(y, y) . w), (t . x), z, u) (3)
dc(v, w, x, (y . z), (N(y, t1, t2) . u)) →
dc(v, (OK(y, y) . w), x, (t1 . (t2 . z)), u) (4)
OK(m,n) → OK(Nil, Nil) when m,n ∈ N (5)
Note that these rules are terminating and conﬂuent when oriented left to right, so
the equality problem is clearly decidable. Intuitively, the rules denote the following
operations related to leftmost derivations:
(1) Initial derivation step, using a terminal rule.
(2) Initial derivation step, using a nonterminal rule.
(3) Subsequent derivation step, using a terminal rule.
(4) Subsequent derivation step, using a nonterminal rule.
(5) Hiding of the non-terminal that is discharged (iﬀ it is a name).
Theorem 3.1 The deduction problem for E is decidable.
Proof. By inspection, the rewrite rules have the property that T → T ′ implies that
|T | ≤ |T ′|, so no term is of greater syntactic size than its normal form. Thus, all
equivalence classes are ﬁnite modulo injective renaming. To check deducibility, we
check if any of a ﬁnite (modulo injective renaming as above) number of terms can
be primitively generated, which clearly is decidable. 
3.3 Translation
Given the rewrite system above and a context-free grammar, we look for a pair of
frames that are indistinguishable if and only if the grammar is unambiguous.
Deﬁnition 3.2 If G := (AG,XG, sG, TG ∪ NG) is in CNF where AG ∪ XG ⊂ N ,
and fX : N × N → X and gX : N × N × N → X are injective functions with
range(fX ) ∩ range(gX ) = ∅ for X = V,N , then we let
ϕG := (νAG ∪XG)
({[
T(a,b)/fV (a,b)
] ∣∣ (a → b) ∈ TG
}
∪
{[
N(a,b,c)/gV(a,b,c)
] ∣∣ (a → bc) ∈ NG
})
,
ψG := (ν n(range(ψG)))
({[
id(fN (a,b))/fV (a,b)
] ∣∣ (a → b) ∈ TG
}
∪
{[
id(gN (a,b,c))/gV(a,b,c)
] ∣∣ (a → bc) ∈ NG
})
At the corresponding point in the proof of [2] (Proposition 5, page 17) the authors
conclude: “Then we can verify that [an undecidable property holds] if and only if
[the two frames are statically equivalent].” However, they say nothing of how to
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verify that. To clarify this for ourselves and others, we devote the remainder of this
paper to a proof of this proposition in our setting.
3.4 Derivations
In what follows, we assume a ﬁxed context-free grammar G in CNF where
G := (AG,XG, sG, TG ∪ NG). The following lemma shows that partial derivations
of G can be simulated by the rewrite system. In order to state the lemma, we ﬁrst
need some auxiliary deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 3.3 We deﬁne the following shorthand notations for terms.
lists Let [] := Nil and [w˜v] := (v . [w˜]).
grammar rules Let rule(k → lm) := N(k, l,m) and rule(n → a) := T(n, a).
derivations Let derx() := x and derx(r1r˜
′) := (rule(r1) . derx(r˜
′)).
derivation lengths Let dl(0) := Nil and dl(n + 1) := (OK(Nil, Nil) . dl(n)).
We can then state the lemma.
Lemma 3.4 Let tailk(w˜) := wk+1 . . . w|w|. Then sG →
k
G a˜n˜ using the partial left-
most derivation r˜ := r1r2 . . . rk, where a˜ ∈ A
∗
G and n˜ ∈ X
∗
G, iﬀ for any x,
dc(Nil, Nil, Nil, Nil, derx(r˜)) →
2k−1 dc(sG, dl(k), [a˜], [n˜], x).
Proof. By induction on k. 
Example 3.5 As an example, let us consider a context-free grammar for a paren-
thesis language. Let G := ({l, r, a}, {S, S′, L, R}, S, TG ∪ NG) where TG := {S →
a, L → l, R → r} and NG := {S → SS, S → LS
′, S′ → SR}. It is straightforward to
verify that G is in CNF.
Numbering the rules from 1 to 6 according to the order of appearance above, a
leftmost derivation of the word lara is given by r˜ := 4, 5, 2, 6, 1, 3, 1 (i.e., S→ SS→
LS′S→ lS′S→ lSRS→ laRS→ larS→ lara). Moreover,
dc(Nil, Nil, Nil, Nil, derNil(r˜))
= dc(Nil, Nil, Nil, Nil, (N(S, S, S) . derNil(tail
1(r˜))))
→ dc(S, dl(1), Nil, (S . (S . Nil)), (N(S, L, S′) . derNil(tail
2(r˜))))
→ dc(S, (OK(S, S) . dl(1)), Nil, (L . (S′ . (S . Nil))), derNil(tail
2(r˜)))
→ dc(S, dl(2), Nil, (L . (S′ . (S . Nil))), (T(L, l) . derNil(tail
3(r˜))))
→ dc(S, (OK(L, L) . dl(2)), (l . Nil), (S′ . (S . Nil)), derNil(tail
3(r˜)))
→ · · · → dc(S, dl(7), (a . (r . (a . (l . Nil)))), Nil, Nil).
Lemma 3.4 can be generalized to show that ϕG 
E accurately models leftmost
derivations of the grammar G.
Proposition 3.6 If w ∈ A∗G then w ∈ L(G) iﬀ
ϕG 
E dc(sG, dl(1 + 2|w|), [w], Nil, Nil).
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Proof.
⇒ Assume that w ∈ L(G). Then there exists a leftmost derivation sG →
∗ w
described by the tuple r˜ := r1r2 . . . r2|w|−1. By Lemma 3.4 we have
dc(Nil, Nil, Nil, Nil, derNil(r˜)) →
4|w|−3
dc(sG, dl(1 + 2|w|), [w], Nil, Nil).
Clearly ϕG 

p dc(Nil, Nil, Nil, Nil, derNil(r˜)).
⇐ Assume that ϕG 
E U := dc(sG, dl(1 + 2|w|), [w], Nil, Nil). Then there
exists U ′ ≡E U such that ϕG 
p U
′. Note that no rule creates a dc function
symbol at the top level if there was not already one. Thus, since the frame
does not contain any dc symbols, at the top level of U ′ there must be a dc
function application.
By inspection of the grammar rules, and since all letters of w are restricted in
the frame, no subterm of [w] except for Nil is deducible. Thus, by inspection of
the rewrite rules, the subterm [w] of U must have been generated by repeated
application of rule (1) or (3), consuming T(x, t) terms where t ∈ AG.
Note that all terms in the frame ϕG are in normal form. Since no rewrite
rule introduces a T function symbol, and all terminal and nonterminal symbols
of the grammar are restricted in the frame, any T(x, t) where t ∈ AG are from
range(ϕG), and thus x ∈ XG.
In other words, whenever the third argument to the top-level dc function
symbol grows (rules (1) and (3)), it is by using a terminal rule of G. Since the
fourth argument only shrinks by application of rule (3), we can conclude that
it always is a list of non-terminal symbols of the grammar.
By a similar argument, whenever the fourth argument to the top-level dc
function symbol grows (rules (2) and (4)), it is by using a non-terminal rule
of G. From this follows that there must exist r˜ such that the last argument of
the top-level dc function symbol of U ′ is equal to derNil(r˜).
By the restriction on the frame, the subterm sG of U is not deducible. By
inspection of the rules, it must have been generated using rule (1) or (2). Thus,
U ′ = dc(Nil, Nil, Nil, Nil, derNil(r˜)), so by Lemma 3.4 sG →
∗ w.

Our main technical lemma is a full characterization of the terms that can be derived
by ϕG, in the case where G is unambiguous. When starting from a primitively
generated term that was in normal form before applying the substitution, rewrite
rules can only be applied as intended (derivation steps of the grammar G). To show
this, we deﬁne a deterministic rewrite strategy and prove it to be injective for this
class of initial terms (L0 below).
Lemma 3.7 Let G be ﬁxed as above, and assume that G is unambiguous. Let L′0
be the set of (possibly open) terms in normal form that do not contain any name in
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AG ∪XG. Let D0(x) := {dc(Nil, Nil, Nil, Nil, x)} and for k > 0
Dk(x) := {dc(n, dl(k), [a˜], [n˜], x) | a˜ ∈ A
∗
G ∧ n˜ ∈ X
∗
G ∧
n→kG a˜n˜ using a leftmost partial derivation}
Let the sets L′k for k > 0 be the smallest sets satisfying the rule (der) below.
(der)
U ∈ L′k
U
[
W/x
]
∈ L′k+l·|U |x
if k ≥ 0, l > 0 and ∃V ∈ L′0 with W ∈ Dl(V )
Let Lk := {UϕG | U ∈ L
′
k ∧ v(U) ⊆ dom(ϕG)} and L := ∪k∈NLk.
Note that the Lk are disjoint for diﬀerent k. We then have:
(i) If ϕG 
 U , then U↓ ∈ L.
(ii) If U,U ′ ∈ L0 and U ≡E U
′, then U = U ′.
Proof. Assume a well-ordering on contexts compatible with the partial well-ordering
induced by the depth of the hole, and let  be rewriting where the redex with the
greatest context is always chosen. Note that this strategy is deterministic and com-
plete.
Let P (i) be the conjunction of (I) and (II) below:
(I) If U0 ∈ L0 and U0 
∗ Ui ∈ Li where Ui  then one of (a) to (d) holds.
(a) Ui (1) Ui+1 ∈ Li+1 by some D0((T(y, t) . u))  U →
h
(1)∈ D1(u) where
T(y, t) ∈ range(ϕG); or
(b) Ui (2) Ui+1 ∈ Li+1 by some D0(N(y, t1, t2))  U →
h
(2)∈ D1(u) where
N(y, t1, t2) ∈ range(ϕG); or
(c) Ui (3) Ui.5 (5) Ui+1 ∈ Li+1 by some Dj((T(y, t) . u))  U →
h
(3)→∈
Dj+1(u) where T(y, t) ∈ range(ϕG); or
(d) Ui (4) Ui.5 (5) Ui+1 ∈ Li+1 by some Dj((N(y, t1, t2) . u))  U →
h
(4)→∈
Dj+1(u) where N(y, t1, t2) ∈ range(ϕG).
(II) For each U ′0 ∈ L0 such that U
′
0 
∗ U ′i ∈ Li and Ui 
∗ U ′i+1 ∈ Li+1 as above,
we have that U ′i+1 = Ui+1 implies U
′
0 = U0.
We show that P (i) holds for all i ∈ N, by induction on i (see the Appendix). Given
this, the statement of the lemma follows quickly.
(i) Assume that ϕG 
 U with U in normal form. Since equality is based on a
convergent rewrite system and preserved by arbitrary substitution of terms for
variables, we have that ϕG 
 U iﬀ there is U
′ ∈ L0 such that U ≡E U
′. By
∀i ∈ N. P (i), U ′↓ ∈ L, so U ∈ L by conﬂuence.
(ii) Assume that U1, U2 ∈ L0 and U1 ≡E U2. By deﬁnition there is V such that
V 	→, and U1 
∗ V and U2 
∗ V . By ∀i ∈ N. P (i) there is k such that
V ∈ Lk, and U1 
∗ V as by P . Since the Lk are disjoint for diﬀerent k, we
also have U2 
∗ V as by P . P (k − 1) then yields U1 = U2.

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Note that the statement of this lemma does not hold if G is ambiguous since in that
case, two diﬀerent elements in L0 can rewrite to the same term. For this reason,
a similar characterization is hard to ﬁnd in the general case. For instance, in the
setting of [2] it is often the case that two diﬀerent terms (in the counterpart to our
L0) can rewrite to the same term.
3.5 Reduction
We now know in suﬃcient detail how the grammar G relates to ϕG, and can proceed
to the main result of this paper:
Theorem 3.8 A grammar G in CNF is unambiguous iﬀ ϕG ≈E ψG.
Proof. As above, we write G := (AG,XG, sG, TG ∪NG).
⇐ We prove the contrapositive of the implication from right to left. Assume that
G is ambiguous. Then there exists w ∈ A∗G with two diﬀerent leftmost deriva-
tions r˜1 and r˜2. Let varOf(k → lm) := gV(k, l,m), varOf(n → a) := fV(n, a)
and ti := dc(Nil, Nil, Nil, Nil, [varOf(r˜
i)]) for i = 1, 2. By Lemma 3.4, we
have that
t1ϕG →
∗ dc(sG, dl(1 + 2|w|), [w], Nil, Nil) and
t2ϕG →
∗ dc(sG, dl(1 + 2|w|), [w], Nil, Nil),
so t1ϕG = t2ϕG. By inspection, t1ψG 	→ and t2ψG 	→, so t1ψG 	= t2ψG. Thus
ϕG and ψG are not statically equivalent.
⇒ Assume that G is unambiguous. Let M and N be terms in normal form such
that (n(M) ∪ n(N)) ∩ (bn(ϕG) ∪ bn(ψG)) = ∅ and
(v(M) ∪ v(N)) ⊆ dom(ψG). Let M1 := MϕG, M2 := MψG, N1 := NϕG,
and N2 := NψG.
• Since ψG is injective, range(ψG) is in normal form,
N ∩ range(ψG) = ∅, n(ψG) \ bn(ψG) = ∅, and range(ψG) does not contain
any function symbols that appear in rewrite rules, we have that M2 and N2
are in normal form. Then, by the injectivity of ψG, M2 ≡E N2 implies that
M = N , so M1 ≡E N1.
• Assume instead that M2 	≡E N2. Then M 	= N , so by the injectivity of ϕG,
we do not have M1 = N1. By Lemma 3.7, M1 	≡E N1.

Corollary 3.9 Since the ambiguity problem for context-free grammars is undecid-
able, ≈E is undecidable for E as deﬁned above.
4 Conclusions
In conclusion, we have showed that there exists a message language where the
construction problem is decidable but the indistinguishability problem is not. Since

E can be reduced to ≈E in the presence of encryption [1], this means that there
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is a price to pay for the more sophisticated indistinguishability-based deﬁnition of
secrecy: Static equivalence is harder than knowledge!
Since the adversary can apply any combination of cryptographic operations in
the course of a man-in-the-middle attack, the state-space of cryptographic proto-
cols is inﬁnitely branching on protocol input. Bounding the number of operations
reduces the branching factor to ﬁnite but often intractable levels. The standard
solution to this problem is to switch to symbolic semantics, where each input only
gives raise to one (constrained) variable. Finding suitable classes of rewrite systems
that yield decidable static equivalence and knowledge problems in this setting is an
interesting possible topic for further work; the STA tool [7] already implements a
decision procedure for knowledge under any image-ﬁnite message algebra.
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A Appendix
Proof. (Lemma 3.7, continued)
We show that P (i) holds for all i ∈ N, by induction on i.
Base case: i = 0; we seek to show P (0). Take U0 ∈ L0, and let U ∈ L′0 be such that U0 = UϕG. Let
U0 be the redex of U0 with the greatest context C0, such that U0 = C0[U0] and U0 →h V .
(I) Since U is in normal form, range(ϕG) ∩N = ∅ and range(ϕG) does not contain OK symbols, we have
that U0 
→h(5). We show that U0 
→
h
(3,4)
by contradiction.
• Assume that U0 = dc(v, w, x, (y . z), (t . u)) where t = N(y, t1, t2) or t = T(y, t1) for some
x, y, z, t1, t2, u, v, w.
· If t 
∈ range(ϕG), then U = C[dc(v′, w′, x′, (y′ . z′), (t′ . u′))] where t′ = N(y′, t′1, t
′
2) or
t′ = T(y′, t′1) for some C, x
′, y′, z′, t′1, t
′
2, u
′, v′, w′, by the injectivity of ϕG and since range(ϕG)
does not contain dc or ( . ) symbols. Thus U →, which is a contradiction.
· If t ∈ range(ϕG) then y is restricted. By inspection of range(ϕG) we can only generate y inside a
T or N, which contradicts the assumption on the structure of U0.
We may then assume that U0 = dc(Nil, Nil, Nil, Nil, (x . u)) where x = T(y, t) or x = N(y, t1, t2).
Clearly U0 ∈ D0((x . u)). As above, if x 
∈ range(ϕG) then U →, which is a contradiction. We then
have U0 →h∈ D1(u), so U0  U1 ∈ L1.
(II) Take U ′0 ∈ L0 such that U
′
0 
∗ U ′1 ∈ L1 where U
′
1 = U1. Let U
′
0 be the redex of U0 with the greatest
context C′0, such that U
′
0 = C
′
0[U
′
0] and U
′
0 →
h V ′. By (I) above, U
′
0 
→
h
(3,4,5)
and V ′ ∈ D1(TΣ). Since
V (resp. V ′) is the only subterm of U1 (resp U ′1) in D1(TΣ), we must have C0 = C
′
0 and V = V
′.
Since the rules (1) and (2) are injective, we have U0 = U
′
0. Thus U0 = U
′
0.
Induction case: Assume that U0 ∈ L0 and U0 ∗ Ui ∈ Li where Ui . Moreover, let U ∈ L′0 be such
that U0 = UϕG. Let Ui be the redex of Ui with the greatest context Ci, such that Ui = Ci[Ui] and Ui →
h.
To compare terms in diﬀerent stages of-rewriting, we let ∼=C for a context C relate terms (or contexts)
that coincide down to (exclusive) the depth of the “hole” in C and on the content (or position) of the “hole”.
(I) Let U ∈ L′0 be such that U0 = UϕG. By the properties of , U0 = C0[W ] for some W 
∗ Ui and
C0 ∼=C0 Ci. There are ﬁve possibilities for Ui →
h.
1 If Ui →h(1), then Ui = dc(Nil, Nil, Nil, Nil, (T(y, t) . u)). By inspection of the rewrite rules,

→h Ui, 
→h Nil, 
→h T(y, t) and 
→h (T(y, t) . u). By the properties of  we then have
W = dc(Nil, Nil, Nil, Nil, (x′ . u′)) where x′↓ = T(y, t) and u′↓ = u. Since range(ϕG) does
not contain any dc symbols, we get that
U = C[dc(Nil, Nil, Nil, Nil, (x′′ . u′′))]
for some C, x′′, u′′ such that C0 = CϕG and (x
′ . u′) = (x′′ . u′′)ϕG. Since U is in normal form,
we must have x′′ ∈ dom(ϕG) and thus x
′ = T(y, t) ∈ range(ϕG), because otherwise U →.
By Lemma 3.4, we then have Ui →h∈ Dk+1, so Ui ∈ Li+1.
2 As 1 above.
3 If Ui →h(3), then by deﬁnition Ui = dc(v, w, x, (y . z), (T(y, t) . u)) for some x, y, z, t, u, v, w.
We prove that Ui is in some Dk((T(y, t) . u)) by contradiction.
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• We may assume that this is the ﬁrst time that rules (1-4) are applied to some redex not
in Dl(TΣ). By induction, we have that redexes in Dl(TΣ) ∩ Lj only -rewrite to terms in
Dl+1(TΣ)∩Lj+1 in two steps for j < i. Then, by the properties of, there are x
′, y′, y′′, z′, t′, u′, v′, w′ ∈
L0 such that y′ i1 y, y′′ i2 y and U0 ∼=C Ci[dc(v
′, w′, x′, (y′ . z′), (T(y′′, t′) . u′))]. By
strong induction, we then have that y′ = y′′, so since ϕG is injective we also have U →, which
is a contradiction.
We thus have Ui ∈ Dk((T(y, t) . u)), and then (y . z) = [n˜] for some n˜ ∈ X
∗
G, so speciﬁcally
y ∈ XG. By inspection of the rewrite rules, 
→
h (T(y, t) . z), 
→h T(y, t), and 
→h y. Since y is
restricted in the frame, we must then have that T(y, t) ∈ range(ϕG). By Lemma 3.4, we then
have Ui →h∈ Dk+1, so Ui ∈ Li+1.
4 As 3 above.
5 By inspection, Li 
→(5).
(II) Assume that U ′0 ∈ L0 such that U
′
0 
∗ U ′i ∈ Li and U
′
i 
∗ U ′i+1 ∈ Li+1 as above. Let C
′
i be
the greatest context of a redex U
′
i such that U
′
i = C
′
i[U
′
i ] and V, V
′ be such that Ui+1 = Ci[V ]
and U ′i+1 = C
′
i[V
′]. By (I), there exist k, k′ ≥ 0 and y, y′ such that Ui ∈ Dk(TΣ), U
′
i ∈ Dk′(TΣ),
V ∈ Dk+1(y) and V
′ ∈ Dk′+1(y
′). We show that Ci = C′i by contradiction.
• Assume that C′i 
= Ci. By symmetry we may assume that C
′
i < Ci. By the properties of , we
then have (by induction) that U0 ∼=C′
i
C′i[V0] for some V0 ∈ Dk′+1(TΣ). Since ϕG does not contain
any dc symbol we must have V0 ∈ L0, but L0 ∩ Dl = ∅ for l > 0.
Since Ci[V ] = Ui+1 = U
′
i+1 = C
′
i[V
′], Ci = C
′
i gives that V = V
′. Since the Ll are disjoint for
diﬀerent l, we also have k = k′. Since the Dk(x) are disjoint for diﬀerent x, y = y
′.
(a) If k = 0, we have by (I) that Ui →h(1,2) V and U
′
i →
h
(1,2)
V . Since the rules (1,2) are injective,
Ui = U
′
i and thus Ui = U
′
i . By P(i-1), U0 = U
′
0.
(b) If k > 0, we assume that V = dc(v, dl(k+1), [a˜], [n˜], y). By induction (using the properties of
) there are r˜, r˜′ of length k + 1 such that
Ui−k =Ci[dc(Nil, Nil, Nil, Nil, dery(r˜))]
U ′i−k =Ci[dc(Nil, Nil, Nil, Nil, dery(r˜
′))]
By Lemma 3.4, v →kG a˜n˜ using the partial leftmost derivations described by either of r˜ and r˜
′.
Since G is unambiguous and in CNF, we must have r˜ = r˜′. Thus Ui = U
′
i , so Ui = U
′
i . By
P (i− 1) we get U0 = U ′0.

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